The Jurisdiction Map 2.3D.1-1

The jurisdiction map converts the abstraction of polycentric governance into a concrete visual artifact. It is a tool for designing governance before you build it and for diagnosing governance problems after the system is operating. Where the organizational accountability ladder (2.1.6) traced decision-to-decision-maker within a single institution, and the enterprise governance charter (2.3D.1) names the authorities and their constraints, the jurisdiction map shows the spatial relationship between authorities — what decision domains they occupy, where they overlap, and where gaps expose capture pathways.

The Map as Architecture

A jurisdiction map is not an organizational chart. An organizational chart shows reporting lines — who supervises whom. A jurisdiction map shows decision domains — what authority touches what decisions, where overlaps create redundancy, and what constraints apply.

The basic template names five elements for each jurisdiction. First, the jurisdiction itself — the authority name (board, executive, operations, product, audit, participant council). Second, the domain — what it decides (strategic direction, hiring, feature roadmap, data handling, complaint resolution). Third, the constraints — what the jurisdiction cannot unilaterally do, what supermajorities it needs, what other jurisdictions it must consult. Fourth, the overlap points — which other jurisdictions touch decisions in this domain, and where dual sign-off is required. Fifth, the review cycle — how often decisions in this jurisdiction are re-examined, and what triggers review outside the normal cadence.

Table 2.3D.1-1a: Jurisdiction Map — Feature Development Example

Shows how a single decision domain (feature development) distributes across four jurisdictions with defined constraints, overlaps, and review cycles.

The map shows the structural logic: product drives forward, operations provides the reality check on capacity, audit ensures data integrity does not degrade, and the participant council provides outside perspective. No single authority rewrites the system without the others seeing it.

Building the Map

The first jurisdiction map is archaeology — it maps where decisions actually happen, not where they should happen.

The process begins with listing every significant decision type in the enterprise: product direction, hiring, compensation, vendor relationships, budget allocation, data handling, participant escalations, strategic pivots. A typical enterprise carries twenty to forty distinct decision types. For each decision, the map identifies who actually decides — not who should decide, but who does. Is it a single person? A committee? Informal consensus? The honest answer goes on the map.

Next, the map names the overlaps that already exist, even if they are unintentional. If the executive hires but the board approves executive-level hires, that is an overlap. If product makes roadmap decisions but engineering blocks them for technical reasons, that is an overlap. The map captures what is, not what ought to be.

Then the map identifies gaps. Are there decisions that touch multiple jurisdictions but only one is actually consulted? A data-handling change that only product decides, but audit should be involved, is a gap. Gaps are capture pathways — the structural openings through which authority can expand without check. The quarterly hazard scan from the organizational level (2.3C.4) provides the detection methodology: where does the current authority distribution create opportunities for gaming, capture, or unilateral redefinition?

Finally, the map is drawn. The format is straightforward: boxes for jurisdictions, lines for overlaps, and a table for each jurisdiction naming domain, constraints, and review cycles. The map is for clarity, not aesthetics.

Calibrating Overlap Density

Not all authorities need overlapping jurisdiction on everything. Too much overlap paralyzes decision-making. Too little, and single authorities become kingdoms.

The calibration heuristic: decisions that affect participant data, participant trust, or long-term strategy should touch at least three authorities. Decisions that are purely operational — hiring for a specific role, approving a vendor invoice — can be single-authority with constraint-checking (audit may flag process violations after the fact). The overlap does not distribute veto power equally. Board veto applies to strategic direction and charter amendment, not to daily operations. Audit veto applies to data-handling integrity, not to hiring. Operations veto applies to capacity commitments, not to product vision. The participant council provides formal input and escalation rights, not operational veto. Asymmetric veto is intentional — the map reflects which authorities are most critical for which decision types.

The calibration follows the same structural logic as the restraint principle (1.2.3): the amount of governance overhead should be proportional to the consequence of the decision. Decisions that are reversible, local, and low-consequence need minimal multi-jurisdiction involvement. Decisions that are irreversible, enterprise-wide, and high-consequence need maximum overlap and the slowest decision path. The governance structure imposes friction where friction prevents the most damage — and removes friction where speed serves the enterprise without creating capture risk.

The Capture-Pathway Audit

Once the jurisdictions are mapped, the map is tested against capture pathways — the predictable sequences through which governance shifts from serving participants to serving entrenched authority.

Scenario 1: Executive capture. The executive gradually consolidates hiring authority, dismisses audit challenges to budget allocation, and uses information asymmetry to reframe what the board should oversee. The test: if operations hiring is subject to audit review, the executive cannot build loyalty patterns invisibly. If audit has independent authority and budget (not dependent on the executive), the executive cannot starve oversight. If board selection is not controlled by the executive, the board can refresh if it detects drift. If the participant council has formal escalation rights and uses them, external pressure alerts the board to problems. The capture pathway requires compromising multiple independent authorities simultaneously.

Scenario 2: Board capture. The board gradually becomes a closed club of insiders, redefines governance in its own favor, and makes strategic decisions without consulting operations or participants. The test: if operations has authority to raise capacity concerns that the board must address in writing, the board cannot make promises the enterprise cannot keep. If audit has independent authority to review board decisions for reasonableness, hidden decisions surface. If the participant council has formal escalation to a board committee independent of board operations, board drift becomes visible.

Scenario 3: Audit capture. The audit function, dependent on the executive for budget and appointment, gradually becomes compliance theater — checking boxes rather than challenging integrity. The test: if audit reports directly to the board rather than the executive, audit independence is structural. If audit budget is independent (a fixed percentage of total budget, not discretionary), the executive cannot starve oversight. If the audit chair rotates on a fixed schedule and cannot be reappointed immediately, the role does not accumulate personal capture.

The map will not perfectly prevent capture. But a well-designed polycentric map multiplies the conspiracies required. A single captured authority is dangerous. Three captured authorities simultaneously — across independent bodies with different appointment mechanisms, reporting structures, and stakeholder accountabilities — is a fundamentally different problem: harder to hide, harder to sustain, and harder to execute without at least one authority raising the alarm.

Diagnosing Map Failures

Three failure patterns indicate that the map has drifted from polycentric governance into something less structural.

The first is the phantom overlap: the map shows audit and product both approving data-handling changes, but in practice only product decides and audit rubber-stamps. The diagnostic is behavioral: do overlapping authorities ever actually block each other? If they never do, the overlap may be phantom. Polycentric governance creates friction sometimes — the absence of friction is a signal, not a success.

The second is cascade authority: authority flows downward in a single chain. The board approves strategy, the executive implements it, operations executes it. Every decision is ultimately checked against a single higher authority. This looks polycentric but functions as a hierarchy. The diagnostic: can a lower authority block a higher authority's decision? If not, the design is cascade, not polycentric. Genuine polycentric design includes upward accountability.

The third is hidden authority: the chart shows formal authorities, but real decisions happen in executive lunches with the board chair, in founder veto power that is not written down, or in informal agreements that bypass the charter. The formal map is theater; informal authority is real. The diagnostic: does the map match how decisions actually get made? If not, update the map to reflect reality. A polycentric map that does not match practice is worse than useless — it is dishonest.

The Map as Living Document

The jurisdiction map is maintained, not filed. Quarterly review checks whether the authority distribution still matches reality and whether new decision types have emerged that the map does not cover. Annual refresh evaluates whether overlaps still create productive friction rather than paralysis, and whether new capture pathways have appeared. Crisis debrief, when governance problems surface, updates the map to prevent recurrence. The map is how polycentric governance becomes infrastructure — public, auditable, and responsive to evidence of what is working and what is failing.